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THE RULE OF CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER: SCOPE
OF ITS APPLICABILITY*
Chester James Antieaut .

T

HE rule of clear and present danger originated in 1919 in an
attempt by Mr. Justice Holmes to formulate a principle for the
limitation of liberty wit:4 a conscious, intelligent weighing of the
opposed societal interests.1 In the Schenck case, the societal and individual interest in freedom of expression clashed with the societal interest in defense of the state. 2 In conB.icts of this kind the criterion
has had its most frequent application. 3 The societal interest in preservation of the state was adequately protected by application of the test
in prosecutions arising under the Espionage Act of 1917, although Mr.
Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis remarked that the principle
was disregarded, or destroyed in its application, by the majority. 4

I
Statutes Proscribing Specific Utterances

There is little doubt as to the applicability of the clear and present
danger test to a statute designed, in general terms, to protect political
institutions. Is it, however, applicable to cases arising under statutes
directed at the use of language of a specified character deemed by the
legislature to constitute a danger of substantive evil? Justices Holmes
and Brandeis believed that the proper test, even here, was clear and
present danger. 5 Nevertheless, the majority of the United States Su"'Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree at the Law
School of the University of Michigan. The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks the
valuable suggestions and criticisms of Professor Paul G. Kauper, of the University of Michigan
Law School, in the preparation of this article.
t Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law.-Ed.
1 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919).
2 The general secretary of the Socialist Party had circulated to men who had passed
draft boards a leaflet urging opposition to conscription.
s Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 39 S.Ct. 249 (1919); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 40 S.Ct. 17 (1919); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 40 S.Ct.
205 (1920); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732 (1937); West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319
U.S. 583, 63 S.Ct. 1200 (1943).
4Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 at 627, 40 S.Ct. 17 (1919); Schaefer v.
United States, 251 U.S. 466 at 486, 40 S.Ct. 259 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252
U.S. 239 at 271-3, 40, S.Ct. 205 (1920); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 at 673, 45
S.Ct. 625 (1925).
5 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 at 673, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925).
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preme Court of l 925 ruled that the test was not applicable "when the
legislative body has determined . . . that utterances of a certain kind
involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished...." 6
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Sanford said:

"It is clear that the question in such cases is entirely different
from that involved in those cases where the statute merely prohibits certain acts involving the danger of substantive evil, without any reference to language itself, and it is sought to apply its
provisions to language used by the defendant for the purpose of
bringing about the prohibited results. There, if it be contended
that the statute cannot be applied to the language used by the
defendant because of its protection by the freedom of speech or
press, it must necessarily be found, as an original question, without any previous determination by the legislative body, whether
the specific language used involved such likelihood of bringing
about the substantive evil as to deprive it of the constitutional
protection. In such cases it has been held that the general provisions of the statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific
utterance of the defendant if its natural tendency and probable
effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative
body might prevent. And the general statement in the Schenck
case that the 'question in every case is whether the words are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils,'-upon which great reliance is placed in the defendant's
argument,-was manifestly intended, as shown by the context, to
apply only in cases of this class, and has no application to those
like the present, where the legislative body itself has previously
determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances
of a specified character." 7
It is intriguing, to say the least, to find Mr. Justice Sanford informing Mr. Justice Holmes that the latter did not intend a test of general
applicability, notwithstanding the clear words and specific assurance of
Mr. Justice Holmes to the contrary.8
It may be inferred that the Gitlow exception continued to be
affirmed by the Court's majority at least until 1932, for in that year the
Court dismissed an appeal of conviction under a state espionage act to
which the state court had held the Gitlow exception applicable. 9 In the
6Jd. at 670.
7Jd. at 670-671.
SJd. at 673.
9 Lazar v. Commonwealth, 286 U.S. 532, 52 S.Ct. 639 (1932).
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Lazar case the statute forbade any "utterance which advocates or teaches
the duty, necessity or propriety of engaging in crime, violence, or any
form of terrorism, as a means of accomplishing political reform or
change in government." The state court "conceded that there was no
evidence of immediate action or disorder" from the accused's soapbox
speech on a Philadelphia comer advocating revolution by force. Nevertheless, it stated that "the commonwealth is not required to prove that
there was an outbreak or a demonstration of violence. The language
used was a clear .abuse of the inestimable privilege of free speech and
was inimical to the public welfare. The effect of such language may
not be immediately manifested, but his ranting utterances clearly had
for their ultimate purpose the undermining of the stability and the
usurping of the powers, by force, of the constituted authority. That
is sufficient to warrant the conviction."10 Obviously this is not the
application of the clear and present danger concept. The Lazar case
is typical in that generally ~'the state courts which have considered the
constitutionality of their criminal syndicalism laws have ...not applied
the test of clear and imminent danger."11
The Gitlow exception was not exactly repudiated by the Court
in Herndon 11. Lowry. However, Mr. Justice Roberts, for the Court,
used language possibly indicating the end of legislative supremacy in
this situation. "The power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and
of assembly is the exception rather than the rule," he said, "and the
penalizing even of utterances of a defined character must find its justification in a reasonable apprehension of danger to organized government. The judgment of the legislature is not unfettered. The limitation upon individual liberty must have appropriate relation to the safety
of the state. Legislation which goes beyond this need violates the principle of the Constitution."12 Although Mr. Justice Roberts purported
to "distinguish" the Gitlow and Herndon statutes, the Georgia statute
was a clear indication that the legislature considered particular language
inducing persons to join in any combined resistance to the state a
v. Lazar, 103 Pa. Super. 417, 157 A. 701 at 703 (1931).
"The Constitutionality of Legislation Limiting Freedom of Speech and
Press," 9 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 265 at 270 (1935); note, 84 Umv. PA. L. R:Ev. 390 at 398
(1935): ''The lack of probable danger has not bothered any of the state courts"; Miller,
"The Case of Civil Liberties v. National Security," 47 Th:cx. L. REv. 117 at 123 (1942):
''The Pennsylvania decisions uniformly require no clear and present danger"; People v.
Lloyd, 304 ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922); State v. Kassay, 126 Ohio St. 177, 184 N.E. 521
(1932); People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315, 201 N.W. 358 (1925); People v. Steelik,
187 Cal. 361, 203 P. 78 (1921); State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 204 P. 958 (1922); State
v. Diamond, 27 N.M. 477, 202 P. 988 (1921).
12 301 U.S. 242 at 258, 57 S.Ct. 732 (1937).
10 Commonwealth
11 Goldstein,
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danger of substantive evil, and the reversal of conviction weakens the
authority of the Gitlow case.
Furthermore, the Court in 1943 reversed a conviction under a state
statute wherein the legislature had indicated that it considered too
dangerous a specific kind of language urging disrespect for the B.ag, and
this time a unanimous Supreme Court agreed that the clear and present
danger test was applicable to such a statute.13 Relying considerably on
this case, a capable commentator could conclude: "The United States
Supreme Court definitely abandoned the 'dangerous tendency' rule in
connection with prosecutions for seditious utterances and adopted the
less stringent rule of 'clear and present danger.' "14 And a sound jurist
could say, in ruling the clear and present danger test now applicable to
a prosecution under a statute wherein the legislature had specifically
proscribed language advocating overthrow of the government: "The
cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States since the decisions in the Gitlow and Whitney cases . . . have modified and overruled the principles announced in those cases, and have adhered to the
principles announced in the dissenting opinions of Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, as applied to the 'clear and present danger' doctrine."15
It is impossible to say with exactitude what can be implied from
the Court's amazing refµsal to review convictions of conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force
and to advocate insubordination in the armed forces, in spite of the fact
that the lower federal court applied the Gitlow exception and specifically held the clear and present danger test inapplicable to prosecutions
under the Alien Registration Act of 1940.16 After the denial of certiorari in the Dunne case, a qualified scholar could only conclude regarding the clear and present danger concept: "To just what type of
cases this test is applicable remains unsettled."17 · Fortunately, the following year the Supreme Court stated of a prosecution under the
Espionage Act of 1917 that intent must be proved, and "the second
13Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 63 S.Ct. 1200 (1943). The statute forbade
words "which reasonably tend to create an attitude of stubborn refusal to salute, honor or
respect the Hag•••."
14 Quisumbing, "The Clear and Present Danger Rule as a Limitation of Freedom of
Speech and of the Press," 22 PmLIPPINE L. J. 136 at 141 (1947).
15 Barefoot, J., for the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals in Wood v. State, 77 Okla.
Crim. Rep. 305 at 327, 141 P. (2d) 309 (1943).
16The so-called "Smith Act" of June 28, 1940, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 9, 10, 11. Dunne v.
United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 137, cert. den. 320- U.S. 790, 64 S.Ct. 205
(1943); rehear. den. 320 U.S. 814, 815, 64 S.Ct. 426 (1944).
17 FRAENKBL, OUR Civn. LIBERTIES 70 (19"!4).
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element is an objective one, consisting of a clear and present danger,
that the activities in question will bring about the substantive evils
which Congress has a right to prevent. Both elements must be proved
by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt."18 Appeals from current prosecutions under the federal sedition laws will likely resolve
whether the clear and present danger criterion is applicable thereto. It
may well be unconstitutional to deny expression under a statute of this
kind with less societal necessity than required under the clear and present danger criterion.
That the Gitlow exception possesses possibilities of application beyond sedition and syndicalism statutes is evident from a lower federal
court's refusal, in reliance upon the Gitlow decision, to apply the clear
and present danger test to the non-Communist affidavit requirement of
the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. "When, as here," said
the court, "the specific statement that he is not a Communist is required
of the individual, the relation of the statement to the evil sought to be
avoided, and the necessity that it be made, has been determined by the
deliberations of Congress. On the other hand, if the statute provides
that inquiry may be made, but does not describe the inquiry in express
terms, an individual cannot be forced, in violation of his freedom of
silence, to make a specific statement unless it appears that, without it,
there is a clear and present danger of the apprehended evil. It is only
in the latter instance that the clear and present danger ·doctrine applies.
This distinction is clearly shown in Gitlow v. New York. ..."19 This
tortured expansion of the Gitlow exception is completely unsound
constitutional law in light of the Court's Barnette decision. 20 There
the determination of the legislature had been just as specific in demanding a particular form of communication, namely, the Hag salute, yet
the Supreme Court clearly emphasized that the "freedom of silence"
cannot be abridged short of a clear and present danger.
Further expansive possibilities appear in a recent treason prosecution. When defense counsel insisted upon application of the clear and
18 Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 at 687, 64 S.Ct. 1233 (1944). The opinion
of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Butler v. United States refers to the clear
and present danger test, but seems to apply the tendency test. 138 F. (2d) 977 at 981
(1943). In United States v. Pelley, the same court again spoke of the rule of the Schenck
case which "settled ••• what constitutes seditious utterances," yet referred respectfully to
the tendency test. 132 F. (2d) 170 at 178-9 (1942), cert. den. 318 U.S. 764, 801, 63 S.Ct.
665, 829 (1943). The other reported prosecutions under the Espionage Acts do not refer
to the clear and present danger test.
19 National Maritime Union v. Herzog, (App. D.C. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 146 at 165.
20West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943).
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present danger test to the broadcasts of the defendant for the enemy,
the Court of Appeals for- the First Circuit announced: "Congress may
make criminal any type of dealing with the enemy which in its judgment may have the potentiality of harm to our national interests, including acting as a commentator on the enemy's short-wave station.
Conviction could be had under such a criminal statute whether or not
the prohibited acts, in the particular case~ actually created any clear
and present danger of substantial harm to the United States."21 Without endorsing the Gitlow exception, one can readily agree that the demands of the First Amendment are not, and should not, be applicable
to wartime utterers of treasonous propaganda from enemy lands. Quite
obviously such activity contributes little to the successful functioning
of our democracy.
A capable commentator discerns "a strong possibility" that the clear
and present danger test will be applied to all prosecutions for expression.22 Any greater deference to the legislature is inconsistent with historical purpose,23 the structure of tlie Constitution,24 successful functioning of a democratic-representative government,2 5 and the natural
rights of our people.26 To permit temporal majorities to abridge freedom at will by refinement of legislative draftsmanship, which is what
the Gitlow exception amounts to, is judicial abdication utterly inconsistent with the role and responsibility of the judiciary to our constitutional society. .

II
Statutes Outlawing Subversive Organizations

A majority of the 1927 Supreme Court gave benediction to avoidance of the clear and present danger test in a prosecution under a statute providing for the punishment of "any person who ... organizes or
21 Chandler v. United States, (C.C.A. 1st, 1948) 171 F. (2d) 921 at 939, cert. den.
336 U.S. 918, 69 S.Ct. 640 (1949).
22 Fraenkel, "Some Current Civil Li'berties Problems," 15 BnooKLYN L. REv. 12 at 13
(1949).
2a It is naive to imagine that Jefferson would have opposed judicial invalidation 0£ the
Sedition Law or other legislative denials 0£ freedom. See his letter 0£ Oct. 19, 1789 to
Madison. 1 TuCXER, LIFB OF JBFFBRSON 282 (1837). It is clear that Madison demanded
a strict judicial review 0£ legislative attempts to abridge freedom. 1 U.S. CoNG, .ANNALS, 1st
Cong., 440.
24 West Virginia Board 0£ Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 639, 63 S.Ct. 1178
(1943).
.
25 1 CooLBY, CoNsTlTUTIONAL UMITATIONs, 1st ed., 429 (1868).
26 MAru:TAIN, T= RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW (1945).
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assists in organizing, or is or knowingly becomes a member of any
society, group or assemblage of persons organized. or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism."27 Such conviction
was not, according to the majority, "repugnant to the due process
clause as a restraint of the rights of free speech, assembly, and association."28 Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote a concurring opinion, joined in by
Mr. Justice Holmes. Although they agreed in affirming the conviction
inasmuch as the defendant had not in the trial court claimed that the
statute as applied to her did not satisfy the clear and present danger
test, they emphatically denied that the legislature was the final judge
of whether the clear and present danger existed from the proscribed
activity, and they made it clear that they were "unable to assent to the
suggestion in the opinion of the court that assembling with a political
party, formed to advocate the desirability of a proletarian revolution by
mass action at some date necessarily far in the future, is not a right
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment."29
The earlier-noted unfortunate refusal to review the Dunne convi~tions30-one count of which was for membership in an association
advocating the forceful overthrow of government-leaves uncertain
whether the Court requires application of the clear and present danger
test to prosecutions under membership statutes.
The test has not generally been applied by state courts to prosecutions for organizing or joining subversive groups.31 In State v. Roloff,
however, the Oregon court apparently felt some necessity for satisfying
the test, for,. after quoting the language of Mr. Justice Holmes in the
Schenck case, and Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Whitney case, it observed
"that the defendant and his associates in the Communist Party were
engaged in acts of serious consequence which contemplated the immediate use of violence and crime."32 And, in 1937, a California court
recognized the applicability of the test to a prosecution of organizers
of groups allegedly dedicated to criminal syndicalism, although the
conviction was reversed solely because of irreconcilable verdicts.33 It
27Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct. 647 (1927).
2s Id. at 371.
20 Id. at 379.
80 Note 16, supra.
81 In addition to the principal case, see: State v. Laundy, 103

Ore. 443, 204 P. 958
(1922); People v. Lloyd, 304 ID. 23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922); State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash.
351, 195 P. 211 (1921); State v. Lowery, 104 Wash. 520, 177 P. 355 (1918); People v.
Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 305, 201 N.W. 358 (1925), appeal dismissed (because of death of
appellant) 273 U.S. 782, 47 S.Ct. 470 (1926).
82 138 Ore. 568 at 605, 4 P. (2d) 326 (1931).
ss People v. Chambers, 22 Cal. App. (2d) 687, 72 P. (2d) 746 at 753 (1937).
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was not until 1943 that a conviction under a membership statute was
reversed because the trial court had not given a charge under the clear
and present danger criterion. In Shaw v. State, Judge Jones said for
the Court: "It is our conclusion that . . . notwithstanding this legislative declaration, especially in view of decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States ... that a -defendant being tried on a charge of
being a member of an organization advocating criminal syndicalism
has a right to have submitted to the jury as a question for their determination whether the principles alleged to have been advocated by the
organization are such as to present a real and imminent danger of
violence, sabotage, or unlawful acts against our government."34
It is submitted that a proper application of the clear and present
danger concept demands a charge that to convict under these statutes
the jury· must find that the membership of the accused in the party
constitutes a clear and present danger to the security of the government'.
"It is of the essence of the institutions of liberty," said Charles Evans
Hughes, "that it be recognized that guilt is personal. . . ."35 After
quoting with approbation these words, the United States Supreme
Court in 1943 emphasized "that under our traditions beliefs are personal and not a matter of mere association, and that men in adhering
to a political party or other organization notoriously do not subscribe
unqualifiedly to all of its platforms or asserted principles."36 It is hard
to conceive that mere inactive membership in a political party or other
organization allegedly subversive can ever constitute a clear and present
danger to the United States. Failing proof of such peril, convictions
for association might well be unconstitutional.37 Although, admittedly,
a jury may more readily find a clear and present danger to the .security
of the state from the organizers or national officers of a syndicalist group,
_constitutional freedoms of speech and assembly require application to
them of the same criterion.38
76 Okla. Crim. Rep. 271 at 312, 134 P. (2d) 999 (1943).
Quoted in footnote in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 at 154, note 41,
63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943).
.
as Id. at 136.
87 "Since it unlikely that inactive membership can ever constitute a clear and present
danger of an attempted overthrow of the government, a prohibitory or substantially prohibitory statute proscribing such membership would in most cases appear to be unconstitutional
in that it abridges individual liberties without an overriding justification.'' Note, 61 HAnv.
L. REv. 1215 at 1222 (1948); "The application of such statutes to inactive members in the
absence of a. grave present danger from syndicalist organizations is" open to serious question.''
Note, 45 HAnv. L. REv. 927 at 928 (1932).
ss CHAFEE, Frum SPEECH IN nm UNITED STATES 471-2 (1941); note, 61 HAnv. L.
REv. 1215 at 1217 (1948): "The clear and present danger rule seems equally applicable
to organizing and membership clauses.'' There are commentators who feel there is a clear
34

85
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Although it is naive to imagine that the clear and present danger
test will immunize any "radical" from conviction by an impassioned
jury, judicial review of this question of constitutional fact will somewhat prot~ct freedom of association from the perils of an emotionalized
majority. The language of an able jurist passing upon the constitutionality of a conviction under a membership statute with no jury determination of clear and present danger is worth remembering: "If this
Court were to sustain the conviction it could only be because there is
a popular demand for it and this in effect would mean a substitution
of mob rule for that of courts of law."39
There are appearing legislative findings that membership in subversive organizations constitutes a clear and present danger to. the security of the nation. Said the Sub-committee on Legislation of the
Committee on Un-American Activities in 1948: "Acting alone, the
Communist Party of the United States does not constitute a substantial threat to the nation but, acting as it does as the American bridgehead of the Red Army ... the Communist Party of the United States,
without question, constitutes a clear and present danger to our national
security."40 Although "the weight to be given the legislative finding of
a 'dear and present danger' is an open question,"41 it seems safe to
predict that the Court will consider its existence a question of constitutional fact for independent judicial ascertainment. 42
Notwithstanding the Dunne denial of certiorari, it has been forecast that "the Smith Act ... probably will be narrowly construed and
its application limited to activities presenting a clear and present danger to national security."43 Invaded as they are today by membership,
association and affiliation statutes, the constitutional freedoms of speech
and assembly will be given contemporary significance by such a decision, which is long overdue. Where the anticipated evil is peril to the
and present danger to the security of the state from the mere existence of the Communist
Party. Cosgrove, "Communism's Criminality," 23 NoTRB DAME LAWYER 577 at 584-5
(1948).
s9 Shaw v. State, 76 Okla. Crim. Rep. 271 at 313, 134 P. (2d) 999 (1943).
Report of the Sub-Committee on Legislation of the Committee on Un-American
Activities on proposed legislation to control subversive Communist activities in the United
States, 80th Cong., 2d sess. 1 (1948). The Mundt-Nixon Bill also contained a finding that
the Communist Party movement presents a clear and present danger to the security of the
United States and to the existence of free American institutions. H.R. 5852, 80th Cong.,
2d sess. (1948) §2.
4 1 "Control of Communist Activities,'' 1 STANFORD L. Rllv. 85 at 105 (1948).
4 2 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947).
43 "Control of Communist Activities,'' 1 STANFORD L. Rllv. 85 at 97 (1948).
40
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political state, the clear and present danger test is particularly applicable and useful in resolving the clash of opposed societal interests.

III
Statutes Denying to "Subversive " Parties a Place on the Ballot

There are as yet few cases deciding the constitutionality of statutes
suppressing the political activities of "subversive'' parties, such as are
now found in at least sixteen states.44 The Illinois statute was held
unconstitutional by a lower federal court not because it failed to pass
the clear and present danger standard, hut because it was too vague
and inde6.nite.45 Without mention of the test, the Supreme Court of
Washington in 1940 held the Communist Party entitled to a place on
the ballot in the absence of proof that it presently advocated the violent
overthrow of government.46 Nor was there any reference to the criterion in Field 17. Hall, upholding application of the Arkansas statute
to the Communist Party.47 It is only in Communist Party 17. Peek,
ruling unconstitutional a large part of the California statute, that the
language of clear and present danger is used. 48
A recent commentator's observation that there is "a total absence
of precedent on this precise point" is not thus quite accurate, but one
can still share his conclusion that it is "uncertain whether a clear and
present danger or a reasonable relationship rule will be applied." 49
And he further seems on sound ground in stating that "ballot statutes ...
44 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin and Wyoming. The
California statute noted below is typical. It must be recognized that minority parties are
frequently kept off the ballot under ingenious numerical and geographical requirement statutes. Amter v. Flynn, 275 N.Y. 396, 9 N.E. (2d) 975 (1937) (Communist Party); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 1 (1948) (Progressive Party); State ex rel. Berry
v. Hummel, 42 Ohio Law Abs. 40, 59 N.E. (2d) 238 (1944) (Prohibition Party). H.R.
1884 of the 80th Congress proposed: "It shall be unlawful for an individual to file as a candidate for, or otherwise attempt to secure election to any federal or state elective office (1) as
the candidate of the Communist Party, or (2) if such individual is a member. of the Communist Party."
45 Feinglass v. Reinecke, (D.C. lli. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 438.
46 State ex rel. Huff v. Reeves, 5 Wash. (2d) 637, 106 P. (2d) 729 (1940).
47 201 Ark. 77, 143 S.W. (2d) 567 (1940).
48 20 Cal. (2d) 536, 127 P. (2d) 889 (1942). Sections of the statute condemned were
those prohibiting any political party using the word "Communist" in its name, and banning
parties "directly or indirectly affiliated, by any means whatsoever, with the Communist Party
of the United States, the Third Communist International, or any other foreign agency,
political party, organization or movement." California Election Code, §§2540.3-4.
49 Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1215 at 1218 (1948). "It is not clear ••• whether such
statutes ••.must be limited to conduct creating a clear and present danger." Note, 54 HARv.
L. REv. 155 at 156 (1940).
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in fact penalize by disenfranchisement the parties and candidates discriminated against. Moreover, the increasing number of restrictive
statutes based on extreme political views underscores the danger that,
by indirect means, the area in which an individual may exercise his
liberties may become so narrowed as materially to reduce their value."50
It should be obvious that recourse to violent usurpation of power
is not at all discouraged by the denial to minority parties of the institutionalized channels of peaceful political change. Entirely aside, however, from the unwisdom of driving dissident groups underground,
freedom of speech and assembly should be abridged by statutes denying the ballot to political parties only when the existence of such a
group is proved to constitute a clear and present danger to the nation.
When such peril exists, present syndicalism statutes afford ample protection to the state. Certainly the orderly use of accepted political
processes constitutes no greater evil.

IV
Statutes Denying Public Employment To Members of Subversive
Organizations

Since the Hatch Act of 1939, federal employment has been denied
to persons who "have membership in any political party or organization
which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government."51 The President's Loyalty Order of 1947 further authorizes
the dismissal of federal employees for "membership in, affiliation with
or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization,
association, movement, group or combination of persons, designated by
the Attorney-General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive,
or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under
the Constitution of the United States by unconstitutional means."52
There are also state laws58 and municipal ordinances54 barring from
50 61 HARv. L. REv. 1215 at 1217 (1948).
515 U.S.C.A., §ll8j (1939). In 1940 the Civil Service Commission ruled that membership in the Communist Party or "any other Communist organization" disqualified an
individual from employment under this section. Dept. Circular No. 222 (June 20, 1940)
57th ANN. REP. Civ. SBRV. CoMM. 21 (1940)
52Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (March 21, 1947).
53 N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law (McKinney, 1946) § 12a; N.Y. Educ. Law (McKinney, 1946)
§3022 (1949 Supp.); Ill. Stat. Ann. (Jones 1934, 1946 Supp.) §23.008; Ark. Stat. Ann.
(1947) §41-4114; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937, 1946 Supp.) tit. 51, c. 1, §§31-35.
54 Ward, ''The Communist Party and the Ballot," 1 BILL OP RrcHTs REv. 286 (1941).
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public employment members of subversive organizations. And closely
related thereto are the requirements of loyalty oaths from public
workers.55
There is as yet a paucity of case authority considering the constitutionality of these public worker statutes, but all the reported cases
uphold the restrictions without reference to the clear and present danger concept. At present it seems unlikely that the United States Supreme Court will hold unconstitutional such ?, statute for failure to
satisfy the clear and present danger criterion. Public employment has
too frequently been labeled a "privilege" and the Court in 1890 stated
that government employees eµjoy only a "privilege revocable by the
sovereign at will."56 This attitude is exhibited in United Public Work. ers v. 1"\II.itchell, upholding the political activity ban of the Hatch Act
without mention of the clear and present danger concept by the majority.57 Furthermore, if union officials can be compelled, consistently
with the First Amendment, to sign non-Communist affidavits before
their union can exercise the "privileges" under the National Labor
Relations Act,58 then, analogically, persons can be denied the "privilege" of public employment unless they take non-Communist oaths. ·
Available precedent, nevertheless, seems lacking in logic and polity.
It is mechanical jurisprudence of the worst sort to deny constitutional
freedoms by the affixation of the label "privilege." Especially is it
unsound to so denominate government service in these days of expanding Leviathan. Furthermore, if freedom of silence requires that the
symbolism of the B.ag salute be tested by the standard of clear and
present danger in its denial of First Amendment freedom, 59 then the
ritualism of the loyalty oath consistently should be tested by the same
criterion.
55 Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal. App. (2d) 481, 199 P. (2d) 429 (1949). Cert. granted
337 U.S. 929, 69 S.Ct. 1494 (1949).
.
56 Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 at 108, 10 S.Ct. 431 (1890).
57 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947). For lower court adjudications on loyalty programs see: Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (App. D.C. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22, cert. den. 330
U.S. 838, 67 S.Ct. 979 (1947), rehearing den. 331 U.S. 865, 67 S.Ct. 1302 (1947); United
States v. Marzani, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 615; Pawell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 146 Pa. Super. 147, 22 A. (2d) 43 (1941), allocatur refused by
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 22 A. (2d) 43 (1941); Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal. App.
(2d) 481, 199 P. (2d) 429 (1949); Washington v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 84 F. Supp.
964; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Clark, (App. D.C. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 79.
58 National Maritime Union v. Herzog, (D.C. D.C. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 146, affd. by
per curiam order, 334 U.S. 854, 68 S.Ct. 1529 (1948) which did not, however, pass upon
the constitutionality of the non-Communist oath provision of the act; Inland Steel v.
N.L.R.B., (C.C.A. 7th, 1948) 170 F. (2d) 247; Wholesale and Warehouse Workers Union
v. Douds, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 79 F. Supp. 563.
59 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943).
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Although Donovan and Jones are probably correct in stating that
"any program undertaken by the Government with regard to restrictions on the employment of federal civil servants will not be required
to meet a constitutional standard of clear and present danger in any
form," 60 most other capable scholars agree to both the desirability and
necessity of applying the test to membership and loyalty oath statutes.
"The clear and present danger test," writes Sherman, "should be applied to the government employee, and becomes essential if we value
personal freedom in view of the increase of our population in these
times." 61 Emerson and Belfield assert: "It seems clear that the Supreme Court should adopt the 'clear and present danger' philosophy in
judging the constitutional limitations of the loyalty program." And
they add significantly: "The issues under the loyalty program are as
basic to the democratic process as any to which the 'clear and present
danger' approach has been applied in the past." 62 Another observer
writes: " 'Clear and present danger' is still the fact by which the allowable degree of political activity of the public servant should be measured, even though the sanction imposed for such activity is discharge
from the service and not a criminal sanction...." 63
There is a very real difference between the proved disloyalty of a
public official and mere membership in or affiliation or sympathetic
association with groups labelled "subversive" by some official in an ex
parte proceeding. One writer states it well: "Disloyalty itself probably
does present a clear and present danger of frustration of the government's activities, disclosure of its secrets, and exposure of its members
to foreign propaganda. But it is another question whether one who is
associated with 'a domestic organization designated by the Attorney
General as ... subversive' can be said to represent such a menace." 64
There are those who believe in the applicability of the clear and present danger test in this area, and who further feel that the presence in
key positions of government of members of radical organizations might
reasonably be found to constitute a clear and present danger. As so
60 Donovan and Jones, "Program for a Democratic Counter Attack to Communist Penetration of Government Service," 58 YALE L.J. 1211 at 1224 (1949).
61 Sherman, ''Loyalty and the Civil Servant," 20 RocKY MT. L. REv. 381 at 394 (1948).
62 Emerson and Belfield, ''Loyalty Among Government Employees," 58 YALE L.J. 1 at
86-87 (1948).
63 Note, 96 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 381 at 401, note 155 (1948). See also comment, 46
MxcH. L. REv. 942 at 950 (1948); Cohen and Fuchs, "Communism's Challenge and the
Constitution," 34 CoRN. L.Q. 182 at 192 and 364-7 (1948); and note, 61 HAn.v. L. REv.
1215, 1217 (1948).
64 Comment, 46 MxcH. L. REv. 942 at 950 (1948). And see Kaplan and Borden, "Validity of Loyalty Tests for Federal Employees," 36 CALIF. L. REv. 596 at 601-602 0948).
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tested by usual constitutional norms, there is, of course, less legal objection to the termination of employment of public workers.
Statutes denying to public workers association in labor unions have
regularly been upheld without reference to the clear and present danger concept. 65 The constitutionality of these limitations upon speech
and assembly should be tested by the clear and present danger standard.

V
Statutes Proscribing Political Activities by Government Employees

The absence of any reference to the clear and present danger test
by the majority in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 66 sustaining the
political activity ban of the Hatch Act, indicates that for the present
there is little likelihood that the criterion will be applied in this area.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas urged that the test was here applicable, 67 and there is also a passing reference to it in the dissent of Mr.
Justice Black. 68 The companion c~e, Oklahomav. United States Civil
Service Commission, sustaining the same prohibition in its application
to state employees remunerated out of federal funds, is equally devoid
of mention of the criterion.69 The failure of the Court to apply the
test to determine the constitutionality of these denials of political expression to millions of our citizens has been decried by capable commentators. Mosher writes: "Where fundamental personal rights and
liberties under the Constitution are at stake, the legislative standard of
'reasonableness' should yield to the rigorous cqncept of 'clear and present danger' giving rise to imperative n_ecessity." He adds: "It is difficult to see how the supposed evil at which the law in question was
aimed constitutes a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of
government. Indeed, the Court conceded in the Mitchell case that the
method chosen by Congress to achieve its purpose was not an indispensable one. Even where the proscribed activity clearly creates an
imminent danger of a serious nature, measures aimed at such an evil,
and which trench upon the guaranties of the First Amendment, are
65Ricks v. Dept. of State Civil Service, 200 La. 341, 8 S. (2d) 49 (1942); Hutcheson
v. Magee, 278 Pa. 119, 122 A. 234 (1923); Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410
(1935); McNatt v. Lawther, (Tex. Civ. App.) 223 S.W. 503 (1920); C.I.O. v. Dallas,
(Tex. Civ. App.) 198 S.W. (2d) 143 (1946); Seattle High School Chapter No. 200 v.
Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, 293 P. 994 (1930); Fraternal Order of Police v. Harris, 306 Mich•.
68, IO N.W. (2d) 310 (1943); City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 676, 24 S. (2d) 319
(1946), cert. den. 328 U.S. 863, 66 S.Ct. 1368 (1946).
66 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947).
67 Id. at 124.
GS Id.at 110.
69 330 U.S. 127, 67 S.Ct. 544 (1947).
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not constitutionally permissible if less objectionable alternative means
are available." And Mosher feels there is justification for the hope
"that the Supreme Court will in time maintain the same construction
of the Constitution affording the same rights of free speech and political activity to government employees as are exercised by other citizens."70 Kramer.agrees in holding applicable to public employees the
usual standard of clear and present danger, although he feels that
"political activity engaged in by permanent administrative civil servants might reasonably be deemed to constitute a 'clear and present
danger' to the objective in which the public has a great interest-a fair,
impartial, politically neutral, efficient Civil Service." 71 Another commentator, after noting that "the Court did not apply the clear and present danger test in any meaningful sense" in the Hatch Act cases,
observes that "this deference to the legislative judgment seems to establish a separate field of Congressional concern in which the existence
of a cle"ar and present danger is either presumed or unnecessary." 72
The clear and present danger standard is not mentioned in the
other federal and state court decisions since 1919 concerned with the
denial of various political activities to government employees. 73
In the instant area the "substantive evil" is not overthrow of the
government, but a "menace [to] the integrity and the. competency of
the [civil] service." 74 Most of us would agree that this is a less substantial evil, and there is no particular justification here for the supremacy of the legislature. If that body can perceive more readily the
dangers of partisanship in federal employment, there is inadequate evidence that they can recognize and weigh the opposed societal interest
in freedom, especially that freedom of political expression which was
the particular solicitude of the founders of our country.w Notwithstanding the mechanistic use of "privilege" and the unfortunate example of the Hatch Act cases, the Court should apply the test of clear and
present danger to balance these clashing societal interests.
70 Mosher, "Government Employees under the Hatch Act," 22 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. Rav.
233 at 251-2 (1947).
71 Kramer, "Political Activities of Federal Civil Servants," 15 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 443
at 453 (1947).
72 Note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 295 at 297 (1947). See also Sherman, "Loyalty and the
Public Servant," 20 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 381 at 394 (1948).
73 United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 50 S.Ct. 167 (1930); Commonwealth v.
McCarthy, 281 Mass. 253, 183 N.E. 495 (1932); McKittrick v. Kirby, 349 Mo. 988, 163
S.W. (2d) 990 (1942); Sarlls v. State, 201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270 (1929); Stowe v. Ryan,
135 Ore. 371, 296 P. 857 (1931).
74 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 at 103, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947).
75 MmxLEJoBN, Fru;E SPEECH AND !Ts RELATION To SELF Gov.BRNMENT (1948).
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VI
Denaturalization and Deportation Proceedings Posited Upon "Subversive" Utterances and Associations
For casual utten~nces as long as thirty and thirty-five years after
naturalization, American citizens have had their naturalization revoked76 by the "legal chicanery"77 that their later expressions indicated
that they were not attached to the principles of our government at the
time of their naturalization. Such example cannot but be a powerful
deterrent to the "millions of naturalized citizens" 78 who might be inclined to express their thoughts and ideas and to aid in the democratic
processes of their government. Judge Hutchinson has said of a denaturalization action before him: "Born of war hysteria and ideological
conflicts, this is another of those fortunately rare proceedings in which
an un-American intolerance, of opinions not acceptable to the majority, puts our adherence to American constitutional principles not only
of tolerance but of justice to the test lest, done mere lip service to, they
become a byword and a hissing." 79 It has been noted that "the administration of the statute has given rise to the suspicion that denaturalization is being used as a sanction for the subsequent conduct itself rather
than for the fraudulent procurement of citizenship,"80 and the suspicion is understandable. Surely, it is too late now to contest that "the
naturalized citizen has as much right as the natural-born citizen to
exercise the cherished freedoms of speech, press and religion."81 Why,
then, is not the clear and present dap.ger test applicable to the imposition of sanctions upon these citizens?The Schneiderman82 and Baumgartner8 3 cases do not demand that
the naturalized citizen's activity constitutes a clear and present danger
to the security of the government. And their insistence upon a par76 United States v. Danner, (D.C. Wash. 1918) 249 F. 989 (thirty years); United
States v. Wursterbarth, (D.C. N.J, 1918) 249 F. 908 (thirty-five years).
77Black, "Disloyalty and Denaturalization," 29 KY. L.J. 143 at 171 (1941).
78 Knauer v. United States, dissenting opinion of Justice Rutledge, 328 U.S. 654 at 676,
66 S.Ct. 1304 (1946).
79 Meyer v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 825 at 825.
80 Note, 44 Cot. L. REv. 80 at 81 (1944).
81 "It is plain that citizenship obtained through naturalization carries with it the privilege
of full participation in the affairs of our society, including the right to speak freely, to criticize
officials and administrators, and to promote changes in our laws including the very Charter
of our Government.'' Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 at 658, 66 S.Ct. 1304 (1946);
note also Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 at 680, 64 S.Ct. 1240 (1944); United
States v. Fischer, (D.C. Fla. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 7 at 8.
82 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943).
83 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 64 S.Ct. 1240 (1944).
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ticular quantum of proof may not protect many other expressive or
gregarious naturalized citizens. 84 If the fundamental freedoms are to be
safeguards of substance to these people, the threat of denaturalization
for the utterance of thoughts antipathetic to the adminstration or the
temporal majority must be effectively removed. Unless we are prepared to acknowledge a second-class citizenship, the basic civil liberties
of naturalized citizens must be as broad and secure as those of naturalborn citizens and delimited by the same criteria. Unless the political,
economic or religious expression or association of any citizen constitutes a
clear and present danger of serious evil, there should be no punishment
therefor. To say that denaturalization is not punishment for crime is
to obfuscate the issue. Certainly, as the Supreme Court has recognized,
such sanction is more serious than the imposition of a fine or other
penalty. 815 And there is no persuasive reason why the clear and present
danger test need be limited to proceedings customarily denominated
"criminal."86
Far greater is the threat of expulsion of aliens who have not yet
been naturalized. Limited judicial review of administrative zeal places
in grave peril any such alien whom we have accepted into our midst
if he should express to us unorthodox political or economic philosophies, or if he should affiliate with a "dangerous" group. For these
things aliens have been frequently deported,8 7 and, except for fair
trial requirements inherent in due process, the Congressional power
of deportation of aliens is generally regarded as well nigh absolute.
There has been one suggestion by a Supreme Court Justice that the
clear and present danger test is applicable to deportation proceedings
posited upon radical utterances and associations. In his concurring
opinion in Bridges v. Wixon, Mr. Justice Murphy said:
"The deportation statute is further invalid under the 'clear
and present danger'· test. . . . Such a statute fails to satisfy any
rational or realistic test. It certainly does not pretend to require
proof of a clear and present danger so as properly to negative the
presumption that individual rights are supreme under the Constitution. It therefore founders in constitutional waters."88
See, for example, Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 66 S.Ct. 1304 (1946).
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 at 122, 63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943).
86 See notes 152 and 153, infra.
87 In re Saderquist, (D.C. Me. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 525, affd. sub nom Sorquist v. Ward,
(C.C.A. 1st, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 890.
88 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 at 164-165, 65 S.Ct. 1443 (1945) concurring opinion.
84

815 Schneiderman

828

MrcmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 48

There are indications that it will be urged further "that the 'clear
and present danger' test also applies to these proceedings...."89 It does
not follow that the clear and present danger test need be applicable
to enemy aliens in time of war or to aliens improperly in the country,
but to aliens whom we have accepted, the First Amendment is applicable on identical terms with citizens. The concept of guilt by association is no more palatable to our American tradition as a restraint
upon alien guests than upon our citizens. Neither the language of the
First Amendment nor the due process clause of the Fourteenth is
restricted to citizens, and surely if one of the reasons for freedom of
expression is the benefit to the hearer, any insulation of ideas upon
those of us who remain is a greater blow to the successful functioning
of our institutions than to the deportee. There should be considerable
doubt that the "rm-American" ideas of Locke and Montesquieu have
imperiled our American way of life.

VII
Statutes Designed to Protect the Public Health
Where the societal interest in expression clashes with the interest
in preserving the public health, the probability of an application of
the clear and present danger test upon an asserted denial of constitutional freedoms is not very great.
Notwithstanding the fact that the clear and present danger test
was argued to the Court in Prince v. Massachusetts, the majority
avoided its application because the exercise of religious liberty in distributing religious literature was thought to imperil the health of the
child. 90 Generally, claims of freedom have not prevented the application of legislation designed to protect the public health and, although
many of these cases antecede the clear and present danger test, later
cases show no indication that the concept will be applied by state
courts without a clear insistence by the United States Supreme Court.
It is unlikely that such insistence is forthcoming.
Claims of religious liberty have been no defense to those who, in
violation of statute, failed to provide medical attention for children.91
Nor has freedom immunized those who violated· compulsory vaccina89 Fraenkel, "Some Current Civil Liberties Problems," 15 BROOKLYN L. Rnv. 12 at 14
(1949).
90 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438 (1944).
91 People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
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tion statutes.92 Subjection of school pupils to compulsory physical
examination has similarly been held a constitutional abridgement of
freedom. 93 And pre-marital physical examinations cannot be avoided
by claims of religious liberty.94 To the crime of practicing medicine
in violation of statute, the defense of religious liberty has regularly
failed. 9is When preachers used poisonous snakes in religious services,
their assertions of religious freedom fell before the societal interest in
protecting the health of the audiences.96 In none of these cases has
there been application of the clear and present danger concept.
Aside from the Prince case, it is doubtful if application of the clear
and present danger criterion would have produced results different
from the decisions. The test serves its prime purpose in stimulating a
conscious, intelligent weighing of opposed societal interests, and demanding a highly persuasive proof of the importance of the opposed
interest and the imminence of its danger. If, in this area of freedom
controversies, the judiciary has adequately performed these responsibilities, there is not much to be gained by insistence upon any particular
verbalization of subjective standard.

VIII
Statutes Designed to Protect the Public Morality

With no mention of the clear and present danger concept, convictions for the use of blasphemous, obscene, and profane language
have regularly been upheld over objections that such punishment
violated constitutional free speech, press or religion. 97 These convictions have usually been sustained on the theory that these words were
offensive at the common law and that statutes proscribing them antedated the state and federal constitutions.98 The United States Supreme
Court has said: "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention of which has never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene,
the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words ...."99
92 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, (1905); Zucht v. King, 260
U.S. 174, 43 S.Ct. 24 (1922).
93 Streich v. Board of Education, 34 S.D. 169, 147 N.W. 779 (1914).
94 Peterson v. Widule, 157 Wis. 641, 147 N.W. 966 (1914).
911 State v. Verbon, 167 Wash. 140, 8 P. (2d) 1083 (1932).
96 Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 839, 44 S.E. (2d) 409 (1947).
97 State v. Mockus, 120 Me. 84, 113 A. 39 (1921).
os State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. (Del., 1839) 553 at 555.
99 Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 at 571, 62S.Ct. 766 (1941).
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More recently, it added: "They are subject to control if they are lewd,
indecent, obscene or profane."100
The clear and present danger test has not been applied to any
permitted censorship of films or stage productions. These attempts to
protect public morality have been considered constitutional since
the Mutual Film case antedating the origin of the test.101 The constitutionality of film and drama censorship has been defended with
various apologetics, none possessed of any particular merit. In the
Mutual Film case, Mr. Justice McKenna denied the applicability of
free speech safeguards to the films because "the judicial sense supporting the common sense of the country is against the contention."102
Where these are found is somewhat mysterious. It is unfortunate, too,
the Court was not acquainted with the words of Mayor Gaynor of
New York City in vetoing a movie censorship ordinance three years
earlier. "The phrase, 'the press,' " he affirmed, "includes all methods
of expression by writing and pictures."103 Mr. Justice McKenna defended film censorship ''because the exhibition of moving pictures is
a business, pure and simple, originated for profit."104 Of course, the
commercial newspaper publisher has been entitled to First Amendment protection for centuries, and labor organizations have not had
their right to picket peacefully hinge upon their unprofitability.
Whether or not the clear and present danger test is to be applied,
there are indications that blanket denial of First Amendment protections
to the films is passe.105
Similarly, the constitutionality of statutes authorizing censorship
of literature has been generally accepted. Dean Pound wrote in 1916
what is orthodox today: "The Constitution does not protect the citizen
in publishing immoral or indecent matter, nor guarantee such publication against prohibition by the legislature."100 When the cases discuss
the constitutionality of censorship in the light of freedom of the press
there is ordjnarily no reference to the clear and present danger concept.107 However, when, in a 1945 Massachusetts case, the defendant
100 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 at 668 (1948).
101 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387 (1915).
102 Id. at 244.
103 Quoted by ERNST AND LoRI!NTZ, CBNSORI!D 166 (1930).
104 236

U.S. 230 at 244, 35 S.Ct. 387 (1915).

105 "Moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom
is guaranteed by the First Amendment." Douglas, J., for the Court, United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 at 166, 68 S.Ct. 915 (1948).
100 Pound, "Eqnitable Relief against Defamation," 29 HARv. L. Rllv. 640 at 653 (1916).
101 United States v. One Obscene Book, (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 821; United
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book-seller argued that his conviction would be unconstitutional unless
it was proved that the book created a clear and present danger to public
morality, the court expressed doubt as to the applicability of the test
but added: "If the so called 'clear and present danger' doctrine ...
applies to cases like the present, it would seem that danger of corruption of the public mind is a sufficient danger, and that actual publication and sale render that danger sufficiently imminent to satisfy
the doctrine."108 And recently Judge Bok of the Court of Quarter
Sessions of Philadelphia has applied the clear and present danger test
to proceedings under the state obscenity statute. After tracing the origin
and applications of the standard he remarks that "the threat [to the
morals of the community] must ... be more than a mere tendency."
"An indefinable fear for other people's moral standards" is not enough
to justify this abridgement of freedom of the press. And he continues:
"The only clear and present danger to be prevented ... [by the statute]
that will satisfy ... the Constitution ... is the commission or the imminence of the commission of criminal behavior from the reading of
a book. Publication alone can have no such automatic effect."109 Finding no clear and present danger to the morality of the community from
the particular books involved, prosecutions against the distributors were
dismissed.
Judge Bok also calls attention to the words of Mr. Justice Rutledge
spoken orally during the argument of a recent obscenity case. "Before
we get to the question of clear and present danger," said the Justice,
"we've got to have something which the State can forbid as dangerous.
We are talking in a vacuum until we establish that there is some
occasion for the exercise of the State's power." He then added: "Yes,
you must first ascertain the substantive evil at which the statute is
aimed, and then determine whether the publication of this book constitutes a clear and present danger. It is up to the State to demonstrate
that there was a danger, and until they demonstrate that, plus the
clarity and imminence of the danger, the constitutional prohibition
would seem to apply."110
States v. One Obscene Book, (D. C. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 525; Parmalee v. United States,
(App. D.C. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 729; Commonwealth v. Friede, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E.
472 (1930); Commonwealth v. DeLacey, 271 Mass. 327, 171 N.E. 455 (1930).
108 Commonwealth

v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543 at 558, 62 N.E. (2d) 840 (1945).
v. Gordon, 66 D. & C. (Pa.) 101 at 144, 150, 155 (1949).
110 Doubleday and Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848, 69 S.Ct. 79 (1948). Language of
Rutledge, J., in 17 U.S. LAw WBBK, 3118 (1948).
100 Commonweaith
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Judge Bok's opinion and decision illustrate that if application of
the criterion stimulates the judiciary to weigh more carefully the competing societal interests, with recognition of the preferred position of
freedom of speech and of the press, and with insistence of at least a
reasonable assurance that the publication will imperil the morality of
the community, the clear and present danger test might well deserve
endorsement in its application to censorship proceedings.111 Professor
Chafee has pointed out that "we do not yet know that the Court will
refuse to apply the clear and present danger test to such matters, because the point has not been raised since the test was formulated ...."112
Certainly, competitive judicial techniques have little to justify approbation. To strip constitutional safeguards from literature because
"obscene" publications were punishable at common law,118 a conclusion
itself somewhat debatable,114 or because use of the mails or entrance
-into the country can be labeled a "privilege,"115 or because of erroneous
notions that freedom of the press does not protect circulation,116 is of
doubtful wisdom and constitutionality.
Professor Chafee thinks "it is very hard to fit into the clear and
present danger test certain parts of the law which have been hitherto
accepted without question, such as the legal rules about profanity,
criminal Hbel and obscenity."117 Although he admits there is no
immediate danger of debased morals, he thinks there is a clear and
present danger of a serious shock to the sensibilities of the readerauditor from obscenity and profanity, and he is willing to continue
beyond the pale such utterances because "they are clearly outweighed
by the social interest in the peace of mind of those who see and hear."118
Although he never wavers from his belief in the propriety of the judicial
balancing of social utilities, Professor Chafee thinks the clear and present danger test may not be the most suitable to the clash between
111 Another magistrate who has faced the problem feels that the clear and present danger
test should be applied to censorship proceedings. IsAAcs, OATH OP DBVOTION 291, 293
(1949).
112 1 CHAPBB, GoVBRNMBNT AND MAss CoMMUNICATIONs 52 (1947).
11s Williams v. State, 130 Miss. 827, 94 S. 882 (1923).
114 "It is clear that at common law there was no obscenity regulation." Kadin, "Administrative Censorship,'' 19 BosT. UNIV. L. REv. 533 at 539 (1939).
115 United States v. Harmon, (D.C. Kan. 1891) ;45 F. 414.
11a United States v. One Obscene Book, (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 821 at 822.
Compare with "Liberty of circulation is essential to that freedom as liberty of publication;
indeed, without the circulation the publication would be of little value." Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727 at 733 (1878); and, "The right of freedom of speech and press ••• embraces the
right to distribute literature." Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 at 143, 63 S.Ct. 862 (1943).
1111 CHAI'BB, GoVBRNMENT AND MAss CoMMUNICATIONS 54 (1947).
llSJd. at 56.
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freedom of expression and the morality of the society. It might be
advisable, he suggests, to rephrase the test-outside the areas of political
and economic expression-into "clear and probable," so that if obscenity
would probably lead to depravity, or profanity provoke disorder, the
state could punish.110 This is retrogression almost to the generally
discredited ''bad tendency" test. It is naive to imagine that judges and
juries could not find "probable evil" as readily as "bad tendency" from
expressions that shocked or disturbed them. The value in the clear
and present danger approach may well lie in its insistence upon imminent societal peril; and any weakening of probabilities necessary
to support suppression will constitute a serious challenge to constitutional freedoms. When Professor Chafee considers shocked sensibilities
a "serious evil" he has lost considerable of the meaning and spirit of
the clear and present danger concept. Society can adequately protect
its "interest in shocked sensibilities" without censorship or criminal
sanction, as the comparative paucity of criminal libel suits well illustrates.120 If we know what is "obscene" and if we can give adequate
guidance to the distributors of literature, society might well, before
imposing criminal penalties upon expression, consider the desirability
of tort recovery for the sensitive perceptor who proves a serious shock
to his sensibilities, assuming, as Professor Chafee seems to, that this is
the societal interest protected by censorship. It may be that certain
films and publications can be proved to constitute a clear and present
danger to the morality of youth. There is little doubt but that this
is a "substantive evil" within the meaning of the concept.
One is entitled to doubt that the morality of states blessed with
film and literary censorship is higher than their neighbors. It is hard
to see a present danger to societal morality from literature121 or the
films; 122 and it is doubtful if there is any provable danger sufficient
ll9 Id. at 59.
120 Riesman, ''Democracy
CHAPEE, GOVERNMENT AND

and Defamation," 42 CoL. L. REv. 727 at 747-748 (1942);
1
MAss CoMMUNICATIONS 41 (1947). For a persuasive argument that criminal libel should be abolished, see ERNST AND UNDEY, HoLD Yoaa ToNctml
282 ff. (1936).
121 " ••• i£ this [clear and present danger] doctrine does apply, then it is difficult to see
wherein lies the present danger to the moral tone of the mass. The morals of any particular
group are slow to change. It is not apparent in what manner a book ••• could presently change
the morals of the community who reads it. Therefore, a change in the moral standard of the
community, which may result from a book such as this, would necessarily be slow and
gradual, the resulting change from many interrelated influences. Such a gradual change is not
a permissible subject for statutory prohibition." Note, 40 ILL. L. REv. 417 at 420 (1946).
122 "But where is the 'present danger' in film censorship.•••" 1 CHAPEE, GoVERNMENT
AND

MAss

CoMMUNICATIONS

52 (1947).
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to justify the subjection of these media of expression to the sanction
most hated by the Founding Fathers-the previous restraint. 123 So long
as the prior restraint principle is applied to censorship, there is no need
for the application of the clear and present danger test. It does, however, become applicabl_e to subsequent punishment statutes which can
have aU the deterrent effect of prior restraints.

IX
Statutes Designed to Ensure the Public Peace and Order
In Cantwell v. Connecticut1 24 where the defendant was charged
with inciting others to breach of the peace, the Court recognized the
applicability of the clear and present danger test to resolve the conflict
between society's interest in expression and its interest in peace and
order. Mr. Justice Roberts stated:
"Decision as to the lawfulness of the conviction demands the
weighing of two conflicting interests. The fundamental law declares the interest of the United States that the free exercise of
religion be not prohibited and that freedom to communicate information and opinion be not abridged. The State of Connecticut
has an obvious interest in the preservation and protection of peace
and good order within her borders.' We must determine whether
the alleged protection of the State's interest ... has been pressed,
in this instance, to a point where it has come into fatal collision
with the overriding interest protected by the federal compact."125
The Court concluded that "the petitioner's communications, considered
in the light of the constitutional guaranties, raised no such clear and
present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable to
conviction...."126
Although breach of the peace was again the only conceivable evil
involved, the unfortunate Chaplinsky decision127 intimated that the
clear and present danger test need not be applied to prosecutions for
the use of "fighting words" that tended to breach the peace. With
this, however, must be contrasted the later T erminiello decision wherein, although the Court did not pass upon the fighting words issue, it
12a Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931).
124 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
12r; Id. at 307.
126 Id. at 311.
127 Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766

(1942).

·
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suggested the clear and present danger test was applicable in the
determination of the constitutionality of punishment for the use of
provocative and disturbing words under a breach of peace statute.128
Animosity and unrest are not "substantive evils" under the Cantwell
decision,1 29 and the T erminiello opinion re-emphasizes that minor disturbances of the public peace and order do not constitute such evils.
It should be recognized that disturbance of the public peace and
order is occasioned oftentimes not by the words of the speaker, but
by the premeditated violence of others. Obviously, there is here no
clear and present danger from the activities of the speaker sufficient
to support his conviction for breach of the peace or inciting thereto. 130
Admitted that most of us would find little social value in ex.
press1ons
our culture labe ls "prof ane,""blasph emous," or "fih•
g tmg
words,"131 yet, we cannot afford the dangerous inroad into freedom
that inevitably follows when we condone convictions for speech because
a judge can see no social utility in the communication. The possibility
of attendant breach of the peace is the only adequate societal justification for the proscription of these utterances, and the constitutionality
of suppression should be measured by the clear and present danger test.
The Thornhill case not only established picketing as free speech,
but also held that it was to be delimited by application of the clear
and present danger criteriori.132 No change in the Court's attitude
need be surmised from non-reference to the test in the picketing decisions between 1940 and 1949. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote
most of the opinions for the Court, is as yet unwilling to apply or endorse
the test. The recent Giboney opinion indicates a return to the language
of clear and present danger in picketing situations. There, Mr. Justice
Black indicated "there was clear danger, imminent and immediate" to
society's interest in freedom from restraint of trade, and the injunction
against peaceful picketing was upheld. 133
It has recently been observed that the Court has yet to determine
if convictions under state "unlawful purpose" picketing statutes can
128 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 894 (1949). Cf. also Cafeteria
Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64 S.Ct. 126 (1943).
120 310 U.S. 296 at 311, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
130 Sellers v. Johnson, (C.C.A. 8th, 1947) 163 F. (2d) 877; note, 61 HARv. L. RBv.
537 (1948); Bolan, ''Freedom of Speech and the Terminiello Case," 24 ST. JoIIN's L. RBv.
83 (1949).
131 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 at 572, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942).
132Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 104-105, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
133 Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684 (1949).
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be sustained consistently with the clear and present danger test.134
Much of this picketing is completely peaceful,135 although this will
not alone immunize the activity, as witness the Court's disregard in the
Giboney case of the union's argument that the injunction was "an
unconstitutional abridgement of free speech because the picketers were
attempting to peacefully publicize facts about a labor dispute."136 This
is not to suggest that the Giboney decision will control under the typical
state "unlawful purpose" statute. Restraint of trade may well be a
substantive evil to the present Court, within the meaning of the clear
and present danger concept, while other inconveniences may not so
qualify. Application of the clear and present danger criterion would
seemingly invalidate many convictions under these "unlawful purpose"
statutes.
It is uncertain at this writing whether the Supreme Court will insist
upon application of the test to these statutes. Ludwig Teller surmises
that without application of the criterion "the Court intends to return
to the several states their traditional jurisdiction to enjoin not only the
unruly picket line, but also the practice of picketing ... for unworthy
purposes."137 On the other hand, an outstanding state supreme court
judge, Justice Traynor of California, has recently asserted that the clear
and present danger test must be applied to these statutes. "Picketing is
protected as an exercise of free speech... ," he notes, and "... when
the elements that differentiate it from other forms of speech are not
present ... some greater evil or more imminent danger must be found
to justify its suppression than would be required to justify curtailment
of action protected only by the due process clause independent of the
First Amendment."138 The Supreme Court's forthcoming decision in
the Hughes case139 may well settle this controversy.
There is no background for application of the clear and present
danger test to situations involving free speech of employers. A capable
commentator notes: "Neither the clear and present danger test nor the
reasonable standard test applied to other situations seems to adequately
fit the problem."140 Application of the test, as well as customary con1a4 Note, 37 CALIF. L. RBv. 296 (1949).
135 Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. (2d) 850, 198 P. (2d) 885 (1948).
186 336 U.S. 490 at 497-498, 69 S.Ct. 684 (1949).
187 Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech," 56 HARv. L. RBv. 180 at 209 (1942).
188 Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. (2d) 850 at 869-870, 198 P. (2d) 885

(1948)
dissenting opinion.
1a0 Cert. granted, 336 U.S. 966, 69 S.Ct. 930 (1949).
140 Sinsheimer, ''Employer Free Speech," 14 UNIV. Cm. L. RBv. 617 at 636 (1947).
And see Armstrong, ''Where are We Going with Picketing?" 36 CALIF. L. RBv. 1 at 34
(1948).
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stitutional safeguards, could be avoided by asserting that expression
amounting to coercion is free speech no more than is picketing enmeshed in violence.141 However, the affixation and negation of labels
is something short of intelligent adjudication and it may be well to
limit employer free speech by the clear and present danger standard.
An unfree electorate among plant employees might well constitute a
substantive evil and, though it is doubtful that application of the test
will produce decisions deviating substantially from those applying _the
coercion, criterion, consistency of judicial technique and notions of
fairness in a rather comparable area of discussion suggest utilizing the
clear and present danger test in the delimitation of employer's free
speech.
Where the opposed societal interest is the concern for the orderly
and impartial administration of justice the Court has found the clear
and present danger test a workable standard, and it should be continued
in the resolution of this conHict situation.142

X
Non-Applicability of the Test in Certain Freedom Controversies

Writing of the clear and present danger test in 1942, John Raebum
Green stated: "The recent decisions seem to indicate that the Court
regards the rule as applicable only to the outright suppression of speech
-not to the licensing, or taxing, or otherwise burdening of it. The
Court has at any rate refrained from referring to the rule in any case
of this latter class, even though in some of these the restraint appeared
to amount, in effect, to an absolute prohibition."143 Two years later
he similarly observed: "The silence with respect to the rule in Follett
v. McCormick indicates that the Court continues to regard it as applicable only to outright suppression of the freedom, not to the licensing,
or taxing, or otherwise burdening of it."144 The observation does not
seem sound today, and Green would probably re-state his position,
141 "Picketing which is accompanied by threats and violence is not free speech and
cannot claim constitutional protection as such." Conwm AND Pm.TASON, UNDBRSTANDINO
nm CoNSTITOTION 89 (1949). Gregory is even critical of the Court placing "the label of
speech ••• on peaceful picketing••••" GREGORY, LABon AND THB I.Aw 349 (1949).
142Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947).
148 Green, ''Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 27 WASH, Umv. L.Q. 497 at

557-558 (1942).

144 Green, "Li"berty Under the Fourteenth Amendment: 1943-44," 43 Mxca. L. RBv. 437
at 465 (1944).
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particularly in the light of Thomas v. Collins.145 There the clear and
present danger test was applied to a statute requiring registration of a
union organizer, an example not of "outright suppression," but of
burdening or licensing. Mr. Justice Rutledge said for the Court:
" ... any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear
public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and
present danger."146 As Green recognizes,1 47 there is no sound reason
why the test should not be applied to abridgements of freedom without distinction to outright suppression or burden.
The United States Supreme Court has regularly refrained from
applying the clear and present danger criterion when the abridgement
of freedom could be declared unconstitutional because it was (I) a
previous restraint,1 48 (2) not narrowly drawn,149 or (3) a tax upon
the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution.ic;o The
judicial preference, in an appropriate situation, for the prior restraint
determinant, rather than clear and present danger, may be justified by
the greater age and acceptance of the former doctrine, but the previous
restraint principle is an utterly unwise attempt to delimit freedom
without any intelligent balancing of societal interests. Surely, there
are some previous restraints, such as prohibition upon publication of
sailing dates of troopships in time of war, that are societally justified;
conversely, there are many subsequent sanctions that are indefensible.
The Court is on sound ground, however, in its preference for the rule
against the vague and uncertain. Dragnets should continue to be invalidated because of the absence of guidance value to one who would
Be law-abiding and to those who must judge of his criminality. And
by invalidating exactions upon the enjoyment of rights protected under
145 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315
146 Id. at 530. Italics added.

(1945).

147 Green, ''Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 27 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 497 at
558 (1942).
,
148 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939); Schneiq.er
v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
60 S.Ct. 900 (1940); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 63 S.Ct. 669 (1943); Largent v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 63 S.Ct. 667 (1943); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. ·
862 (1943); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276 (1946); Tucker v. Texas, 326
U.S. 517, 66 S.Ct. 274 (1946); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148 (1948).
149 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532 (1931); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948).
150 Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444 (1936); Jones v. Opelika,
319 U.S. 103, 63 S.Ct. 890 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870
(1943); Follettv. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 64 S.Ct. 717.(1944) ..
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the Federal Constitution, the Court has blocked out for state legislators an area of unpermitted activity, an achievement not too easy under
any subjective yardstick.
With less reason and without discernible principle the Court has
avoided application of the clear and present danger test in a number
of cases wherein it has condoned denials of freedom. 151 This is not a
testimonial to either the consistency or integrity of the tribunal.
The clear and present danger test originated in a criminal proceeding and is generally thought to be a criminal law standard. There is
not, however, any controlling reason why it should not be applicable
and valuable in delimiting freedom of expression, though the sanction
be something other than criminal penalty. Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District illustrates well the applicability of the test in the
area of non-criminal sanctions. Acting pursuant to a state statute, the
school board had, as a condition to the use of a school auditorium,
requested petitioners to sign affidavits stating that they did not advocate,
nor were they affiliated with any organization advocating or having as an
object the overthrow of the present government of the United States
or of any state by force or violence, or other unlawful means. The
Supreme Court of California, in a well-reasoned opinion by Justice
Traynor, granted mandamus and held the statute was violative of the.
Federal Constitution inasmuch as there was no clear and present danger
to the government from the beliefs or activity of the applicants. The
Court is clearly right in refusing to distinguish between criminal statutes and others, as it affirms: "In each case the State sought to suppress
free speech and assembly and it is immaterial that it sought to accomplish that objective in the one case by threat of punishment and in
the other by censorship."152 There are other illustrations of the successful application of the clear and present danger test in non-criminal
proceedings,1 63 and the test should be applicable to abridgements of
freedom, regardless of the nature of the sanction.
151 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 39 S.Ct. 252 (1919); Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762 (1941); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct.
766 (1942); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 65 S.Ct. 1307 (1945); and Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448 (1949).
152 Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District, 28 Cal. (2d) 536 at 553, 171 P. (2d)
885 (1946).
153 Morgan v. Civil Service Commission, 131 N.J.L. 410, 36 A. (2d) 898 (1944);
National Maritime Union v. Herzog, (D.C. D.C. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 146; Local 309 v. Gates,
(D.C. Ind. 1948) 75 F. Supp. 620; Montgomery Ward v. United Retail Employees, 330 ill.
App. 49, 70 N.E. (2d) 75 (1946); Communist Party v. Peek, 20 Cal. (2d) 536, 127 P.
(2d) 889 (1942).
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Conclusion

The clear and present danger test has, in a great variety of criminal
and civil proceedings, aided the judiciary in balancing and reconciling
opposed societal interests. Although it is as subjective as any of its
competitors, it has more than any other standard stimulated the judiciary
to conscious, intelligent recognition of clashing interests, and to a
realization of the preferred place of the fundamental freedoms in our
socio-legal hierarchy of values. It well merits continuance.

